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When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans

Nathaniel Persily*

*

Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thank you to Jon Burke for help in researching this
topic and to Michael Carvin, Jonathan Katz, Luke McLoughlin, and Michael Pitts for helpful comments. I
am also grateful to the three courts and associated special masters who have appointed me to draw
statewide redistricting plans for New York, Maryland, and Georgia. Needless to say, the opinions
expressed here are solely my own and no communications with those courts or information from those
cases is included in this article.
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Sixty years ago when the Supreme Court first considered a constitutional
challenge to a congressional district map, the idea of judges drawing redistricting plans
seemed unthinkable. As Justice Felix Frankfurter explained in Colegrove v. Green,1 “[o]f
course no court can affirmatively re-map . . . districts so as to bring them more into
conformity with the standards of fairness for a representative system. At best we could
only declare the existing electoral system invalid.”2 As much as the topic of redistricting
itself may have seemed an invitation into the political thicket, no thicket was thought to
be thicker than the one that might ensnare a court tasked with the daunting job of actually
drawing a districting plan itself.
My, how times have changed. In the many redistricting struggles that now follow
each census, plaintiffs routinely turn to the courts not only to strike down plans as illegal,
but also to draw remedial plans to take their place. Courts are not mere referees of the
redistricting process; they have become active players, often placed in the uncomfortable
role of determining winners and losers in redistricting, and therefore, by consequence,
elections. However, judges will learn very few lessons from the relevant caselaw or
secondary literature that can guide them when they are placed in the position of drawing
their own plans. Consequently, the remarkable variation in process and substance of
court-supervised redistricting efforts should come as little surprise.
This essay attempts to describe the lay of the land for court-drawn redistricting
plans and offers some direction as to the principles courts might want to follow in the
future. Part I describes the applicable law, Part II sets forth the procedures involved in a
court-supervised redistricting effort, and Part III describes substantive decisions that
courts must make when crafting the plan.
My goal with this essay is less to argue for one particular set of procedures or
substantive guidelines, than it is to describe the costs and benefits of various approaches.
Although uniform guidelines are sorely needed to provide ground rules for court plans,
the unique context in which a court intervenes will usually influence a plan more than
will the universal factors that confront every court that draws a new map. With that said,
much can be gained by recognizing the hurdles that each court inevitably faces; even if
by necessity, they must jump over them in different ways.
I.

Unique Legal Constraints

As a threshold matter, court-drawn plans must comply with the law, of course.
However, the legal constraints on a court-drawn plan differ somewhat from those
applicable to a legislative plan. Some of these constraints are more stringent for courtdrawn plans while others are less so, and some will depend on whether the court is a
federal court or a state court. It is helpful to think of three different categories of
constraints: (1) those that are uniquely applicable to court-drawn plans,3 (2) constitutional

1

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (plurality opinion)(arguing that redistricting controversies
should not be justiciable).
2
Id. at 553.
3
See infra Part I(A).
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constraints shared by court-drawn and legislative plans,4 and (3) requirements of the
Voting Rights Act.5
A. First Principles
Courts get involved in the process of line drawing either when the state has failed
to construct a map following a census or after the court has declared the state’s current
plan unconstitutional or otherwise illegal. Although it may seem obvious, it is important
to remember that the court’s involvement occurs only after someone initiates a lawsuit.
The reasons for that suit and the basis for the court’s decision will often determine the
extent and character of judicial involvement in crafting a remedial plan. However,
redistricting litigation is not completely unlike other litigation in that, at its heart, a
plaintiff’s claim seeks a judicial declaration that some state action⎯in this case, a law
that specifies the boundary lines of districts⎯violates the Constitution or other legal
requirement.
The difference between redistricting and most other litigation, though, is that once
the court declares the plan a nullity something needs to be done; specifically, the crafting
of a new plan. At the time of Colegrove and into the 1960s it appeared to many judges
that the only potential remedy for an unconstitutional districting plan was to order atlarge elections statewide.6 As the caselaw has developed, however, courts now routinely
cure the violation discovered in the litigation by crafting their own remedial plan.
1. Deference to the State Redistricting Authority
a.

Giving the Legislature a Second Bite at the Apple

Deference to the legislature7 is the starting point for judicial involvement in the
redistricting process. This general rule of deference manifests itself in different forms
throughout the stages of a court’s involvement. At the stage of remedying the legal
violation discovered in a plan, courts ordinarily will allow the legislature to correct its
mistakes to give it a second chance to pass a plan without any of the legal deficiencies the
court identified.8 This deference flows from the widespread recognition in the caselaw
4

See infra Part I(B).
See infra Part I(C).
6
See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 266-70 (2003) (discussing the statutory basis for statewide at large
elections and examples of courts in the 1960s that ordered statewide at-large elections for congressional
delegations); Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 1201.
7
When speaking of deference to the “legislature,” I am also referring to deference to whatever political
body is tasked (usually by the legislature) with the job of crafting redistricting plans. This could be a
commission or some other official at the state level, or any number of government entities (city council,
county commission, counsel’s office) at the local level.
8
See, e.g., Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978)(quotation omitted):
5

When a federal court declares an existing apportionment scheme
unconstitutional, it is therefore, appropriate, whenever practicable, to
afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional
requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the
federal court to devise and order into effect its own plan. The new
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that redistricting is a political matter primarily and appropriately entrusted to the political
branches. As the Court explained in Abrams v. Johnson, “[t]he task of redistricting is
best left to state legislatures, elected by the people and as capable as the courts, if not
more so, in balancing the myriad factors and traditions in legitimate districting policies.”9
In other words, courts tend to draw their own plans only as a last resort. This
general rule has tremendous procedural and substantive implications for the judicial linedrawing process. First, as discussed in Part II, a court is necessarily rushed in
constructing a plan if it gives the legislature until the last moment to draw its own plan.
Second, the compressed time frame in which a court must operate limits the possible
factors it can take into account in crafting the plan. With the luxury of time would come
an ability to mediate among the opposing forces that wish to shape the line-drawing
process in one way or another. In theory, a court with time on its hands could also
repeatedly “improve” its plan after receiving continued input from interested parties. But
such deliberation and deal-making is the stuff of the legislative, not the judicial, process.
Court-drawn plans, in contrast, are emergency measures adopted to ensure that elections
can go forward under some set of legally defensible lines.
b. Deference to State Courts
The general rule of deference to state redistricting policies extends to any state
body, including courts, that may be in charge of the process of redrawing districts.10 The
Supreme Court has explicitly held that a federal court may not enjoin or otherwise
interfere with a state court in the process of crafting its own redistricting plan11: “Absent
evidence that these state branches [including courts] will fail timely to perform that duty
a federal court must neither affirmatively obstruct state reapportionment nor permit
federal litigation to be used to impede it.”12

legislative plan, if forthcoming, will then be the governing law unless
it, too, is challenged and found to violate the Constitution. [A] state's
freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an apportionment plan
found unconstitutional, either as a whole or in part, should not be
restricted beyond the clear commands of the Equal Protection Clause.
See also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1973) (“[J]udicial relief becomes appropriate only when a
legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having
had an adequate opportunity to do so.”)(quotation omitted).
9
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 100 (1997). See also Weiser, 412 U.S. at 794-95 (quotation and citation
omitted):
From the beginning, we have recognized that reapportionment is
primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and
that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to
reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely
fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so. . . . We have
adhered to the view that state legislatures have 'primary jurisdiction'
over legislative reapportionment.
10
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“In the reapportionment context, the Court has required
federal judges to defer consideration of disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its
legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that highly political task itself.”).
11
Id.
12
Id. at 34.
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Thus, in a race between courts to redistrict, the state court will win if it constructs
a legal plan in time for use in the upcoming election. Indeed, a race to different courts (or
more specifically, forum shopping) is often what this rule of deference will promote.
Those who believe that the available state court might craft a more favorable plan than
would a prospective or currently involved federal court will do what they can to ensure a
state court hears the case. As a result, occasionally both state and federal courts will
draw plans at the same time. Although the state court plan must win if done in a timely
fashion,13 unique legal constraints that apply to state court plans but not federal plans,
such as the preclearance requirements of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act,14 can
delay a state court plan long enough that the federal plan must then go into effect.15
c. Deference to State Policies
The deference due the state legislature does not end once a court reluctantly gets
involved in line-drawing. Rather, according to the rules set forth in Upham v. Seamon,16
a federal court plan ought to reflect the policy decisions made by the legislature even
though the legislature has abdicated its responsibility to redistrict.
Whenever a district court is faced with entering an interim
reapportionment order that will allow elections to go
forward it is faced with the problem of reconciling the
requirements of the Constitution with the goals of state
political policy. An appropriate reconciliation of these two
goals can only be reached if the district court's
modifications of a state plan are limited to those necessary
to cure any constitutional or statutory defect.17
Upham built on the Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Weiser,18 which held that:
[A] federal district court, in the context of legislative
reapportionment, should follow the policies and
preferences of the State, as expressed in statutory and
constitutional provisions or in the reapportionment plans
proposed by the state legislature, whenever adherence to

13

See id. at 33-34.
See infra Part I(C).
15
See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003).
16
Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41 (1982)(internal quotations omitted).
17
Id. at 43 (quotations omitted). See also Johnson v. Miller (Johnson II), 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1559 (S.D.
Ga. 1995) (finding that a minimum change plan acts as a surrogate for the intent of the state legislative
body); Stephan v. Graves, 796 F. Supp. 468, 470 (D. Kan. 1992) (noting that the court’s goal should be to
adopt a plan that comes the closest to deferring to the state legislature’s will, as expressed in the
unconstitutional plan, and intrudes on state policy as little as possible); Balderas v. Texas (Balderas I), 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25006, at *6-7, *11 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2001) (holding that court modifications must be
limited to those necessary to cure the statutory or constitutional defects in a state’s plan).
18
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
14

5

state policy does not detract from the requirements of the
Federal Constitution.19
As emphatic as the Supreme Court’s pronouncements concerning deference to
state policies have been, on just a few occasions, none of which occurred in the past two
decades, has the Court overturned a map because the crafting-court did not defer
sufficiently to state redistricting policies.20 Perhaps this is because courts usually adopt
what might be described as “least-change” plans; that is, plans that remedy the identified
constitutional violation but go no further.21 Or perhaps the success of court-drawn plans
derives from the difficulties inherent in discerning whether a non-deferential plan went
too far, or from the sympathy the Supreme Court has for a lower court that must rush to
put a plan in place before upcoming elections.22 Moreover, in most cases where a court
radically redraws a plan, it does so because the underlying legal violation is so pervasive

19

Id. at 795. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79 (1997) (“When faced with the necessity of drawing
district lines by judicial order, a court, as a general rule, should be guided by the legislative policies
underlying the existing plan, to the extent those policies do not lead to violations of the Constitution of the
Voting Rights Act.”). See also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. at 414-415 (internal quotations omitted):
We have repeatedly emphasized that legislative reapportionment is
primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, for a
state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated to
identify and then reconcile traditional state policies. . . . The federal
courts by contrast possess no distinctive mandate to compromise
sometimes conflicting state apportionment policies in the people’s
name. In the wake of a legislature’s failure constitutionally to reconcile
these conflicting state and federal goals, however, a federal court is left
with the unwelcome obligation of performing in the legislature's stead,
while lacking the political authoritativeness that the legislature can
bring to the task. In such circumstances, the court’s task is inevitably
an exposed and sensitive one that must be accomplished circumspectly,
and in a manner free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.
20
See Upham, 456 U.S. at 44 (overturning remedial plan that remedied a two-district violation by
redrawing the entire state plan); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-161 (1971) (overturning court
plan that unnecessarily eliminated multimember district). One could add Connor v. Johnson to the list of
overturned nondeferential plans, except that it is unclear whether the Supreme Court stayed the district
court’s plan because it did not defer to the state plans that used single member districts, or because its plan
violated the general norm for court-drawn plans against the use of multimember districts. See Connor v.
Johnson, 402 U.S. at 693 (staying district court plan that used multimember districts rather than single
member districts); see also infra notes 32-44, and accompanying text. White v. Weiser is also a potential
candidate, although it is unclear whether the Court struck down the district court’s plan because it was
more malapportioned than others before it or because it did not defer to state policies concerning avoiding
incumbent pairings and preserving districts. See White, 412 U.S. at 794-95, 797. Of course, the Supreme
Court has overturned court-drawn plans for other reasons, such as violating the one-person, one-vote rule.
See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425-26 (1977) (overturning malapportioned court plan that
deferred to state’s historic practice of keeping political subdivisions together); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S.
1, 27 (1975) (same).
21
See DAVID BUTLER AND BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, 111-12. See also Johnson II, 922 F. Supp. at 1559; Stephan, 796 F. Supp. at
470; Balderas I, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25006, at *6-7, *11.
22
See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 333 (1973) (emphasizing the difficulty of a rushed court
created plan).
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(as in a wildly malapportioned plan) that the court cannot replace the illegal plan with
one that merely nips at the edges.
If taken seriously, though, the idea of deference to state policies can be a sticky
wicket. In the typical case, such deference could extend to traditional, though not legally
required, districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, retaining the cores of
prior districts, respecting political subdivision boundaries, and protecting communities of
interest.23 But many states also have long traditions of nefarious conduct, such as
malapportionment or racial discrimination, which the Supreme Court has made clear
courts cannot respect. Beyond these, however, are all policies⎯even those that serve the
narrow interests of the original linedrawers⎯deserving of deference so long as they are
not illegal or unconstitutional? In particular, should the court defer to the partisan or
incumbency related motives underlying the enjoined plan?
In White v. Weiser, the Supreme Court came quite close to saying outright that a
court should defer to a state policy of avoiding contests between incumbents.24 Several
lower courts have followed the lead of that decision and explicitly incorporated
incumbent protection concerns into their plan.25 As discussed later, courts that take
account of incumbency do so in order to preserve the constituency-representative
relationship that existed under the enjoined plan,26 and to avoid charges that its plan is
biased against one party.27 However, in protecting all incumbents equally, a court plan
23
24

See infra Part III(A).
White, 412 U.S. at 797:
But here, the District Court did not suggest or hold that the legislative
policy of districting so as to preserve the constituencies of
congressional incumbents was unconstitutional or even undesirable.
We repeat what we have said in the context of state legislative
reapportionment: “The fact that district boundaries may have been
drawn in a way that minimizes the number of contests between present
incumbents does not in and of itself establish invidiousness.” (footnote
omitted).

Justice Thurgood Marshall submitted a separate opinion in White v. Weiser disagreeing on this point and
emphasizing that “the judicial remedial process in the reapportionment area⎯as in any area⎯should be a
fastidiously neutral and objective one, free of all political considerations and guided only by the controlling
constitutional principle of strict accuracy in representative apportionment.” Id. at 799 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part). See also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996) (“We have recognized incumbency
protection, at least in the form of avoiding contests between incumbents, as a legitimate state goal.”).
25
See Johnson II, 922 F. Supp. at 1565 (finding that the protection of incumbents was a legitimate
consideration for a court-drawn plan); Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F.Supp.2d 618, 647
(D.S.C. 2002) (finding incumbent protection to be a traditional state interest in South Carolina).
26
See, e.g., Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F.Supp. 684, 688-89 (D.Ariz. 1992)
(three-judge court):
The court [plan] also should avoid unnecessary or invidious
outdistricting of incumbents. Unless outdistricting is required by the
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act, the maintenance of incumbents
provides the electorate with some continuity. The voting population
within a particular district is able to maintain its relationship with its
particular representative and avoids accusations of political
gerrymandering. (citation omitted)
27
See, e.g., Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F.Supp. 859, 871 (W.D.Wis. 1992) (discussing the court plan’s
lack of incumbent pairings and the correlative avoidance of “perturbation in the political balance of the
state”).
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will also diminish electoral competition and codify the partisan bias of the underlying
plan.28
No court has yet found an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander,29 and most
judges admit to the inevitability of partisanship influencing, if not dominating, plans
crafted by politicians. Although a court might not strike down a plan because of
excessive partisanship, some judges are naturally hesitant to institute a court plan that
consecrates or acquiesces to the partisan motives that underlie the districts in the struckdown plan. After all, the Supreme Court has admonished courts that their redistricting
plans should be drafted “in a manner free from any taint of arbitrariness or
discrimination.”30 Consequently, the impulses of deference and political neutrality run
counter to each other. For the most part, however, courts opt for deference and leave for
another day31 the question of whether the deferential remedial plan is too partisan, or too
incumbent friendly, in its effect.
2. Preference for Single Member Districts
On several occasions the Supreme Court has emphasized that court-drawn plans
should employ single-member, as opposed to multimember, districts.32 This admonition
can best be described as a rule the Court has given to lower courts acting in their equity
capacity to devise remedies for legal violations. In other words, there is certainly no
textual support for this preference for multimember over single member districts.33
Rather, the preference for single over multimember districts comes from the history of
courts reluctantly and hurriedly adopting multimember district plans to remedy early

28

Arguably this is what happened in Texas in the 2002 redistricting, in which a federal court adopted a
“least-change” plan that kept a majority of the Texas delegation Democratic, despite the fact that Texas is a
Republican state. See Balderas v. Texas (Balderas I), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25006, at *13 (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 28, 2001). The 2004 Texas re-redistricting went to the opposite extreme, of course, drawing a map
that enhanced the Republican advantage in a state. See Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 498 (E.D.
Tex.2004) (per curiam), judgment vacated and remanded by Henderson v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 351 (U.S.Tex.
Oct 18, 2004).
29
In Vieth v. Jubilerer, a fractured Court left open the possibility that it might develop a future test for
partisan gerrymanders more stringent than the toothless one of Davis v. Bandemer. Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541
U.S. 267, 281, 317 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Perhaps in the upcoming case out of
Texas, Session v. Perry, the Court will have a chance to clarify the rules on partisan gerrymandering. See
Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
30
Connor v. Finch, 307 U.S. 407, 415 (8th Cir. 1976). But cf. Fletcher v. Golder, 959 F.2d 106, 109 (8th
Cir. 1992) (upholding court-adopted plan that did not investigate the political motivation underlying the
plan or its political consequences).
31
That is, the day if and when the Supreme Court develops a coherent standard for partisan
gerrymandering.
32
Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (“[A] court-drawn plan should prefer single-member
districts over multimember districts, absent persuasive justification to the contrary.”). See also East Carroll
Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976)(same); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692
(1971)(same).
33
Indeed, the Constitution does not mention districting at all and “[i]n colonial days ‘multiple districts were
the rule, single ones the exception.’” Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 158 n.39 (1971)(quoting Maurice
Klain, A New Look at the Constituencies: The Need for a Recount and Reappraisal, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1105, 1112 (1955)).
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malapportionment controversies,34 as well as a parallel line of cases in which plaintiffs
challenged multi-member districts as diluting minority votes.35
The first opportunity for the Court to state its preference for single member
districts was its stay of the district court’s plan in Connor v. Johnson.36 That plan
employed multimember districts for a few counties because the crafting-court said that
insufficient time remained before the candidate filing deadline to break up these
multimember districts into single member districts (as parties to the litigation had
proposed).37 The Supreme Court reversed because it did not believe the claims of the
district court (given the fact that, at the time of its decision, the court had before it single
member district plans), and because it considered single member districts to be
preferable.38 Three years later, in a new incarnation of the same litigation over
Mississippi’s legislative districts, the Court explained its preference:
Because the practice of multimember districting can
contribute to voter confusion, make legislative
representatives more remote from their constituents, and
tend to submerge electoral minorities and overrepresent
electoral majorities, this Court has concluded that singlemember districts are to be preferred in court-ordered
legislative reapportionment plans unless the court can
articulate a “singular combination of unique factors” that
justifies a different result.39
In the intervening years the Court had decided Chapman v. Meier,40 which to this day
remains its most complete explanation for the preference for single-member districts.
First, as the number of legislative seats within the district
increases, the difficulty for the voter in making intelligent
choices among candidates also increases. Ballots tend to
become unwieldy, confusing, and too lengthy to allow
thoughtful consideration. Second, when candidates are
elected at large, residents of particular areas within the
district may feel that they have no representative specially
34

See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 332-33 (1973). See also Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly,
377 U.S. 713, 731 (1964)(suggesting in the context of a one person, one vote dispute that voters might not
like multimember districts).
35
See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 158-159:
[C]riticism (of multimember districts) is rooted in their winner-take-all aspects, their tendency to
submerge minorities and to over-represent the winning party as compared with the party's
statewide electoral position, a general preference for legislatures reflecting community interests as
closely as possible and disenchantment with political parties and elections as devices to settle
policy differences between contending interests.
36
Connor, 402 U.S. at 692 (“[W]hen district courts are forced to fashion apportionment plans, singlemember districts are preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter.”).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977)(citation omitted).
40
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
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responsible to them. Third, it is possible that bloc voting by
delegates from a multimember district may result in undue
representation of residents of these districts relative to
voters in single-member districts.41
Given that the most prominent racial vote dilution cases under either the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Voting Rights Act have involved multimember districts,42
it is hardly surprising to find the Court reluctant to embrace multimember districting as a
remedy that lower courts should follow in their redistricting plans. As contemporary
scholarship has argued, however, many of the alleged shortcomings of multimember
plurality-based systems could be remedied with different types of proportional voting
rules.43 In fact, civil rights advocates who were at the forefront of breaking down
multimember schemes that diluted minority votes, now urge the adoption of such
schemes, modified to dodge what are seen as shortcomings of the single member district
system with respect to minority empowerment.44
B. Unique Constitutional Constraints on Court Drawn Plans: The Stricter
Requirement of Population Equality
All of the constitutional constraints that exist for legislative plans also exist for
court-drawn plans; however, the equal population constraint is stricter for court plans.
Courts, like legislatures, must make sure that the plan they adopt or construct is not
intentionally discriminatory45 and does not use race as the predominant factor,46 unless
necessitated by the Voting Rights Act.47 Insofar as one might discern (or the Court might
create) a constraint on partisan gerrymandering,48 such a prohibition would apply to
court-drawn plans as well. For the most part, though, the stricter one-person, one-vote
requirement for court-drawn plans is the only notable, and often troublesome,
constitutional restriction about which courts concern themselves.
41

Id. at 15-16 (citations and footnote omitted).
See Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (striking down the use of multimember districts
under the Voting Rights Act because it diluted minority votes); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980)
(upholding multimember districting scheme against challenge of constitutional vote dilution); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 756 (1972)(striking down multimember districts as “invidiously discriminatory”);
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156-57 (1971)(upholding multimember districting plan against
constitutional challenge).
43
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 241; Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Cumulative Voting and Minority Candidates: An
Analysis of the 1991 Peoria City Council Elections, 225 AM. POL'Y. REV. 225 (1996); Robert Brischetto,
Cumulative Voting as an Alternative to Districting: An Exit Survey of Sixteen Texas Communities, NAT'L
CIVIC REV., Sept. 22, 1995, at 347-54; Richard Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for
Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. & POL. 469 (1989).
44
See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, NO TWO SEATS: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POLITICAL EQUALITY, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413 (1991); LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY (1994).
45
See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62.
46
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
47
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976 (1996); Miller, 515 U.S. at 921; Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74,
91 (1997).
48
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
42
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As with plans devised by the legislature, the equal population requirements for
court-drawn congressional plans are stricter than those for non-congressional plans.49
Congressional plans must make a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical
equality,50 but courts will allow the legislature to depart from mathematical equality in
other redistricting plans. Although courts will tend to uphold most non-congressional
plans drawn by the legislature with overall deviations under ten percent that can be
justified by some legitimate state interest,51 court-drawn plans must abide by a stricter
standard of population equality.52 Alas, the Court has not identified with precision
exactly what percentage deviation the Equal Protection Clause allows or prohibits for
court-drawn non-congressional plans; all we know is that courts should pay greater
attention than legislatures to the equal population requirement. As the Court has
explained on several occasions, “unless there are persuasive justifications, a courtordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature . . . must ordinarily achieve the goal of
population equality with little more than de minimis variation.”53 This tighter leash
around courts’ necks derives from the fact that they are not in the best institutional
position to decide on state policies that might justify departures from one-person, onevote.54
The strict rule of population equality illustrates the general lack of other guiding
principles for court-drawn plans. Put differently, the Court has expressed very little of
what might be considered a coherent philosophy of representation, but it knows one
thing: districts should have equal numbers of people in them. Thus, that confidence in
the conviction of the equal population requirement leads naturally to courts’ attempts to
perfect that requirement at the expense of other interests in which they are less expert.
The stricter the rule of population equality constraining a plan, the longer it will
take to construct it, and the less attention will be paid to other redistricting principles.
Mapmakers can spend an enormous amount of time “zeroing out” a plan; that is, adding
and subtracting census blocks from districts in order to make them as equal as possible.
Once the basic components of a plan are in place it can take another day or two to bring
the plan to a strict standard of population equality. Courts should keep this in mind if
they expect to allow changes to their plan, or to order changes to a plan drawn by a hired
49

See Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 541 (1978).
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1983).
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See Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983).
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Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1975)(stating that a court-ordered plan should “ordinarily achieve
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Id. See also Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1561 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (“Since federal courts are held
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with the lowest population deviation practicable.”)(citation omitted); Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp.
1329, 1343 (D.S.C. 1992), judgment vacated on other grounds by Statewide Reapportionment Advisory
Comm. v. Theodore, 508 U.S. 968 (1993) (“Given that compliance with the principles of one man, one vote
is the preeminent concern of court-ordered plans, the very real possibility exists that certain state policies
will be compromised in a court-ordered plan which could have been better served had judicial intervention
not been necessary.”).
54
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expert. For plans where the court is intimately involved in the drawing of districts it may
be useful for the court first to view a draft plan and then the expert can incorporate their
changes while zeroing out the plan.
C. Voting Rights Act
As the Court has interpreted it, the Voting Rights Act places peculiar constraints
(if one can call them that) on court-drawn redistricting plans. As far as I am aware, no
court plan has ever been held to violate the Voting Rights Act. Perhaps this is because
courts generally comply with it, or perhaps because the Act is largely considered
inapplicable. In any event, courts go through the motions of reciting the applicable law
and explaining why their plan does not run afoul of the prohibition on race-based vote
dilution found in section 255 and, for covered jurisdictions, does not run afoul of the
prohibition on retrogression found in section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.56
1. Section 2
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits redistricting plans that dilute
minority votes, or cause minorities to have “less opportunity . . . to elect representatives
of their choice.”57 Specifically, section 2 applies to any “voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure ... imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision....”58 The relevant questions for our purposes then are: (1)
whether the court that draws the plan is a “[s]tate or political subdivision” as
contemplated by the Act; or if not, (2) whether section 2 nevertheless covers the plan,
because the state will enforce the plan.
While declaring that “[o]n its face, § 2 does not apply to a court-ordered remedial
redistricting plan,” the Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding section 2’s reach,
that federal courts should comply with section 2.59 To some extent, therefore, the
question of section 2’s coverage is purely academic, given that the Supreme Court has
admonished courts to follow it and no court plan has been held to violate section 2.
55

42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)(2000):
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or
in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
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42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000)(requiring preclearance by the Attorney General or U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia for any changes in redistricting plans enacted by covered jurisdictions).
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Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(describing when a “State or political subdivision” has violated subsection (a));
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
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42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)(2000).
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Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 90 (1997) (“On its face, § 2 does not apply to a court-ordered remedial
redistricting plan, but we will assume courts should comply with the section when exercising their
equitable powers to redistrict.”); Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 628 (D.S.C.
2002); Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 529, 539-40 (S.D.Miss. 2002). Just as with Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, federal court plans and state court plans may deserve different treatment under section 2. See
McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 153 (1981). Section 2 undoubtedly covers a plan drawn by a state
court, just as it covers plans drawn by any other state official.
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However, one searches the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act in vain to find a specific answer to the question of section 2’s coverage of
court-drawn plans.60 All we do know is that, with the 1982 Amendments, Congress
specifically wanted to overturn Mobile v. Bolden,61 which required proof of
discriminatory intent in addition to effect for constitutional vote dilution claims.62 There
is no particular reason to believe that the statute’s preoccupation and prevention of the
potential discriminatory effects of a redistricting plan should depend on the actor that
constructed the plan. Indeed, Congress wanted to prevent dilutive plans regardless of the
intent⎯and arguably the identity⎯of those who constructed them.63 On the other hand,
the caselaw preceding and including Bolden dealt with legislatively enacted plans,64 and
the words of the statute, while ambiguous as to their coverage, certainly do not go out of
their way to include court-drawn plans.65
Although the standard for vote dilution is the same for legislative and court-drawn
plans, the unique redistricting principles that guide a court could affect how its plan
complies with section 2⎯that is, exactly how it designs districts where minorities have
an equal “opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.”66 In particular, a court’s
refusal to look at partisanship and incumbency might lead it to design districts with
higher minority concentrations than it would if it knew the political complexion of the
district or the identity (and race) of the incumbent. For example, it might be the case that
for districts without an incumbent (open seats) a district’s voting age population (VAP)
need only be fifty percent black for African Americans to have an equal opportunity to
elect their candidates of choice. However, if there is a white incumbent, the district
would need to be sixty percent black, and if there is a black incumbent, it need only be
forty percent black.67
Moreover, the percentage needed to comply with section 2 will also depend on the
partisanship of white voters in the designed district and their willingness to vote for the
candidate favored by the African American community.68 For example, a forty percent
black district might be an effective minority district (for purposes of section 2) if half the
whites in the district are Democrat, but will likely not be effective if all the whites in the
district are Republican. The decision not to consider partisan factors will lead a court to
60

See S. REP. No. 97-417, P.L. 97-205, VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1982, MAY 25, 23,
1982.
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Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 63 (1980)(requiring both discriminatory intent and effect to prove
unconstitutional racial vote dilution).
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Id. at 62.
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See infra note 60.
64
See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 756 (1972); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156-57
(1971).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
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Id.
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See Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some
Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1407 (2001) (describing the importance of incumbency and
partisanship for a district’s ability to give minorities and equal opportunity to elect their candidates of
choice).
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See id.; Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm Emerges in New Jersey,
1 ELECTION L.J. 7 (2002) (discussing Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, (D.N.J. 2001) (three-judge
court) (per curiam), a case in which reduced minority concentrations in districts were found to comply with
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
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err on the side of caution, drawing districts with minority concentrations that exceed what
might be necessary if it knew the political predispositions of white voters and the identity
of the incumbent, if any, that would run from such a district.
2. Section 5
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires certain covered jurisdictions to submit
their redistricting plans to the Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia for preclearance to ensure such plans do not have the purpose or effect of
retrogressing with respect to minority voting power.69 The following questions arise
concerning court-drawn plans and section 5: Which, if any, court-drawn plans must be
precleared? For even those plans that do not need to be precleared, should they abide by
the non-retrogression requirement anyway? And if so, what is the appropriate benchmark
against which a court should measure retrogression?
To begin with, the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that section 5 does
not require federal courts to preclear plans they have prepared and adopted.70 However,
that principle implies several qualifications. The first is that this rule applies only to
federal courts.71 State court plans must be precleared just as any “standard, practice or
procedure with respect to voting” that a covered state or jurisdiction seeks to “enact or
administer” must be precleared.72 Moreover, plans proposed by the state and adopted by
a federal court must be precleared.73 “[W]henever a covered jurisdiction submits a
proposal reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people⎯no
matter what constraints have limited the choices available to them—the preclearance
requirement of the Voting Rights Act is applicable.”74
The tricky cases, then, are the intermediate ones that occupy a gray area between
court-adopted and court-drawn plans. Often courts will pick and choose from various
plans offered by the parties to the litigation or other interested groups, including various
officials representing the “state.” The degree of innovation required by a court before a
plan can be said to be court-drawn will depend greatly on the facts of the individual case.
Moreover, courts will often modify their plans to accommodate objections or suggestions
made by political parties and various politicians.
These rules concerning preclearance place a court in a difficult position and raise
a number of questions if the court wishes to involve outside participants in the
construction of the court’s plan: Which accommodations are significant enough to require
preclearance? Should the need for preclearance of a partially adopted plan depend on the
position of power held by the proponent of such changes? The difficulties created by the
preclearance requirement for court-adopted plans provide a disincentive for the court to
hold hearings or accept proposals upon which it could model its plan. Of course, if the
69

See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 477-78 (2003) (most recent case
interpreting section 5 and defining retrogression).
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Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 691 (1971).
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Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 262 (2003) (“The Act requires preclearance of all voting changes, and
there is no dispute that this includes voting changes mandated by order of a state court.”)(citation omitted).
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See id.; Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 95 (1997).
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McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 153 (1981)(holding that the preclearance requirement of the Voting
Rights Act applies to a reapportionment plan submitted to federal courts by the county legislative body).
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Id.
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Act did not require preclearance of such plans then jurisdictions might be able to end-run
the preclearance requirement. They could refuse to pass a plan, and instead, they would
later propose it to the local district court charged with constructing a plan that must defer
to legislative policies (as reflected in the proposed plan).
Even for plans a federal court creates on its own, however, the Court has specified
that they ought to avoid retrogression⎯that is, they should avoid making minority voters
worse off. Echoing the Senate Committee report accompanying the 1975 reauthorization
of the Voting Rights Act, the Court in McDaniel v. Sanchez explained, “in fashioning the
plan, the court should follow the appropriate Section 5 standards, including the body of
administrative and judicial precedents developed in Section 5 cases.”75 The Court later
described this as “a reasonable standard, at the very least as an equitable factor to take
into account, if not as a statutory mandate.”76 Therefore, even though they do not need to
preclear their plans, courts should make sure that their plans for covered jurisdictions do
not make minorities worse off.
The question then remains: worse off as compared to what? What should be the
benchmark against which a court should measure retrogression for purposes of its plan?
The answer according to Abrams v. Johnson is that retrogression should be measured
against the last legally enforceable plan, meaning the last plan that was in effect and
complied with the Constitution and Voting Rights Act.77 This will often mean the plan
immediately preceding the one that the court has just enjoined and now seeks to remedy,
except that in some cases the preceding plan was also unconstitutional or illegal.78
Moreover, this rule produces the somewhat ironic twist that in cases where a court strikes
down a new plan on one-person, one-vote grounds, it may end up using as a benchmark
for Section Five purposes the plan passed ten years earlier, which is now even more
malapportioned due to population shifts than the one the court just struck down.
From the standpoint of administrability, if not fealty to the original intent of
section 5,79 the Court’s most recent decision lowering the bar for what constitutes
retrogression should allay any fears a court might have about its plan’s compliance.
Georgia v. Ashcroft80 significantly defangs section 5, which many previously (and
apparently erroneously) had interpreted as focused on maintaining majority-minority
districts.81 Under Ashcroft, a plan enacted by the legislature need not match the
proportion of such districts in the benchmark plan and can instead opt for fewer majority-
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minority districts and a greater number of “influence districts.”82 Without delving too
deeply into that decision,83 suffice it to say that covered jurisdictions do not need to
worry as much about section 5 as they did previously.
Following Ashcroft, questions such as the appropriate benchmark are likely to
recede in importance as jurisdictions justify their plans as maintaining an appropriate mix
of districts where minorities can influence or control who gets elected. Whereas before
Ashcroft jurisdictions would assiduously attempt to maintain the same number of
majority-minority districts with nearly the same racial percentages, now they can more
easily opt for lower concentrations of minorities among a greater number of districts.
Perhaps this new, flexible rule of retrogression applies to court-drawn plans and
perhaps not. On the one hand, a court plan that reduces the number of majority-minority
districts in favor of a greater number of influence districts does not make minorities
worse off, and does not retrogress according to the Ashcroft standard. However, the
decision to opt in favor of influence districts when the state has a policy of creating
majority-minority districts may go against the general rule of deference that governs
court-drawn plans. The same could be said of a court-plan’s move to majority-minority
districts from a legislature’s plan that created influence districts. Although as a technical
matter, either strategy appears fully compliant with Section 5, the decision over which
strategy to follow could be another one of those legislative decisions to which the courts
should defer.
II.

Process84

A quick review of any random sample of court-drawn redistricting plans would
illustrate the remarkable variety of processes that courts employ when they are
confronted with the “unwelcome obligation” of drawing a district map. Courts vary
considerably in how and when they draw their maps, whom they get to help them, who
will have input into the process and when, and whether they will make changes to a plan
once it is released. In part, this variety (or inconsistency) derives from the unique context
that drives each redistricting process, and in part, it comes from the lack of any data that
can guide courts once confronted with the task. The choice of different procedures,
however, can have a dramatic impact on the final plan that emerges. In this Part I
describe the various approaches and assess the costs and benefits of each.
By way of introduction, I should simply stress the unique environment that
confronts a court as it begins to construct a redistricting plan. It should go without saying
that court-drawn plans can present one of the most intense inter-branch conflicts that our
constitutional system allows. After all, decisions that a court makes in constructing its
plan will often lead to legislators losing their jobs and in some cases might significantly
alter who controls legislative chambers. The courts usually get involved only after
negotiations between the political parties break down, having produced a poisonous
environment of partisan acrimony. Correlatively, the affected parties will analyze each
82
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decision a court makes for any hint of bias, be it partisan, personal or institutional.
Moreover, since the construction of such plans is a group effort, as we shall see in a
moment, there always exists a temptation for each participant to disclaim responsibility
and point the finger of blame toward other participants, once the losers in the process take
aim and try to discredit the court, the plan, or its drafters.
No redistricting plan–and certainly no court plan drawn under exigent
circumstances–is perfect. Indeed, if a plan was possible that could please everyone, then
the court would likely not be involved. The most a court can hope for is a plan that is
immune to legal challenge and can be justified by coherent principles, as well as a
process that is widely regarded as fair, nonpartisan, and transparent.
A. When and Why Should Courts Redistrict?
The nature of the litigation that forces court involvement will often determine the
timing and pace of development of a court-drawn plan. If I had just one recommendation
to make (from the standpoint of one who draws maps), I would urge courts to avoid
waiting until the last minute to begin drawing maps and not to rush the line-drawing
process. The series of frenzied 24-hour days that often precede a court-drawn plan is
suboptimal, to say the least, for construction of plans that will determine representation
for a state for years to come. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the jurisdiction,
the court should only act with its own map once the political branches have failed to pass
their own plan. Giving the legislature every opportunity to complete its plan flows from
the general rule of deference described above. It also makes sense from the standpoint
of saving the jurisdiction money, because the cost of construction of a court-drawn plan
(along with all the supporting materials and participants described below) can often reach
well beyond half a million dollars for a statewide plan.
One way to reconcile the conflicting pressures of time and deference is for a court
to begin drawing its map at the earliest point when it becomes clear that the state will not
be able to craft a legal plan in time for elections. That impasse may be reached soon after
the court issues its decision striking down the extant plan, or it may be reached only after
the parties have pulled their hair out for months and failed to reach a compromise.
Moreover, courts should recognize that by beginning to draw their own map they do not
necessarily prevent the legislature from making headway on its own plan
contemporaneously.
Courts must be aware of several salient dates when deciding on the timetable for
their plan: the dates for the beginning and end of the qualification period for candidates
and parties for the primary election ballot, the date when military, overseas, and other
absentee ballots must be mailed for the primary election, and the other dates specified for
printing ballots and running the elections. Sometimes in the course of a redistricting
struggle and creation of a plan, courts will adjust these dates in order to ensure that
candidates are not prejudiced by the failure of the state to develop its own plan.
However, in order to give the state enough time so that the process for ballot
qualification, ballot printing and mailing, precinct redefinition, and election
administration can go forward, a court should have as its goal the imposition of a plan no
later than one month before candidates may begin qualifying for the primary ballot. This
means that the court should begin drawing its plan about three months before the
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beginning of ballot qualification in order to build in time for possible hearings and
adjustments to the plan.85
I think it is fair to say that given the current state of technology, experts can draw
a redistricting plan for any statewide plan (either legislative or congressional) in about a
week. However, a quick plan is not necessarily a good plan. Indeed, a computer can
draw a statewide equipopulous plan by itself in a matter of hours or even minutes, but it
is unlikely to be one a court (or anyone) would want to adopt. Furthermore, the time
required to produce a plan is a function of the number and character of the constraints
placed upon it. For example, drawing plans for areas where section 2 or 5 of the Voting
Rights Act might present serious constraints will take longer (all other things being
equal) than will drawing a plan for an all-white area. And drawing a plan that takes into
account partisanship, incumbency, or communities of interest will take longer than one
that ignores such factors. Allowing one month for the drawing of a plan and an
additional month for hearings and potential modifications to it should build in enough of
a cushion so that all concerned can proceed in a non-frenzied fashion.
B. Three Models of Judicial Mapmaking
Given how many times courts have drawn their own redistricting plans in the last
forty years, the lack of uniformity as to process is somewhat surprising. Here I describe
three procedural models for court-drawn plans, although an infinite number of
permutations or alternatives are also possible. The modal arrangement involves the
appointment of a Special Master who then submits a plan to the court for its approval or
modification. The second involves more active participation by the court, which hires its
own expert to help the judges draw the plan themselves. And finally, some courts will
merely ask interested parties to submit alternative plans and the court will choose to
adopt or modify one of them.
1. The Special Master Model
Courts will often appoint Special Masters, pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, to supervise the production of a court-drawn plan.86 Courts use
Special Masters for this task in order to place some distance between themselves and the
plan. Because the drawing of district lines can be such a sensitive political task, the
appointment of a Special Master, particularly a retired judge or in some cases a
redistricting expert, allows the court to disclaim responsibility for the specifics of a plan.
Instead, the court’s role under this arrangement could be to set the principles, if any, that
the Special Master will follow in construction of a plan, as well as to approve, reject, or
entertain objections to the plan. This model is resource-intensive since it often requires
the employment of a legal team to help the Special Master develop a report to accompany
the plan, as well as the employment of one or more experts to assist in production of the
85
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plan and the accompanying affidavits. Under such a system, the Special Master often
becomes an advocate and defender of his or her plan, and responds to objections the
parties and the judges raise.
The degree of isolation of the Special Master and his or her distance from the
court depends on the particular context of the litigation. In some cases, the Special
Master is in frequent contact with the court, even showing them drafts of the plans, and in
others the court only receives the plan when the parties to the litigation do.
2. The Court Controlled Model
Sometimes courts will eliminate the middleman and simply hire an expert to help
them draw their own plan or even draw it themselves. This model can be effective (and
inexpensive) for judges who have a good idea as to what they think the plan should look
like or who are less afraid of the potential fallout. Also, for plans that are remedying
limited, specific, and identifiable defects in the extant plan, this approach seems most
appropriate. Such a case might include, for example, a redrawing of just a few districts
that may have been found to violate the Voting Rights Act or Shaw v. Reno.87 Even for
more detailed and extensive plans, though, this approach will sometimes be best where
the court faces extreme time constraints, such that the special master model might be too
cumbersome.
The cost of such an approach, however, is that the court cannot then disclaim
responsibility for its map. As an active participant in the drafting of the plan, the court
should be prepared for the partisan accusations that will often fly upon the plan’s release.
3. The Adopted Plan Model
A court might decide to place the burden of proposing a remedy on the parties to
the litigation or, for that matter, any interested party willing to suggest a redistricting
plan. Under this procedure, the court sits back and evaluates alternatives and selects from
a buffet of options presented to it. This process may or may not require the assistance of
an expert to help evaluate the submitted plans, depending on whether the court feels
confident that it can adequately assess the compatibility of the proposals with certain
legal and other requirements.
As with the other models, there are costs and benefits to this approach. On the
one hand, by outsourcing the drafting process to others, the court has the luxury of
choosing from several plans and can do so with less cost than if it hired a team to draw
the plan. However, the risk always exists that the court might find all proposals deficient,
either because they violate the law or because they arise from narrow and often partisan
interests. If, for example, the court is placed in the position of deciding between a plan
proposed by the Democrats and another by the Republicans, either choice is fraught with
political dangers. Thus, this process might be best used when the likely proposals do not
appear politically risky for the court, as might be true for a local elected body.
Of course, this approach can be merged with either of the two previous
approaches to produce a hybrid in which the court or the Special Master begin by
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accepting proposals offered by parties and other interested groups. If one proposal is
clearly preferable, then it could be adopted, saving the court time. If not, then the court
or Special Master might work off one or more of the plans to produce a hybrid believed
to be superior.
However, an additional drawback to the adopted plan approach and perhaps to its
variants is that the plan might be subject to Section 5 preclearance if it is a plan for a
covered jurisdiction. As noted above, the rule from McDaniel v. Sanchez requiring
preclearance of plans “reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the
people” applies to plans adopted, though not drawn, by a federal court.88 Indeed, for a
federal court deciding which approach to take in imposing a plan for a covered
jurisdiction, the court (and perhaps even the jurisdiction) has the somewhat perverse
incentive to avoid entertaining suggestions from the political branches. The more
influence that the jurisdiction’s elected officials or their proxies have over the court’s
plan, the closer the court comes to adopting a plan that could be held up for 60 days by
the Department of Justice.
C. The Personnel Involved in Drafting a Court Plan and the Division of
Responsibilities Between Them
Depending on which of the above approaches a court pursues, different people
will be involved in the line-drawing process. By the end of a redistricting process
supervised by a federal court, it is not unusual to have witnessed involvement by some
combination of the following people: each member of a three judge panel, one retired
judge or other Special Master, a legal support team of two or more lawyers, somewhere
between one and three redistricting experts who actually draw the districts, an expert on
local political geography, perhaps an expert to perform racial bloc voting analysis, a
handful of technicians and computer specialists, someone in charge of security for both
the data and rooms where the line-drawing takes place, and a staff of people producing
and handling the enormous amount of documentation that often accompanies a plan. The
challenge in selecting people to work on the plan is to find experts in their respective
fields, who are insulated from political pressure, and who have a credible claim to
impartiality and nonpartisanship. This is easier said than done.
In order to rein in spiraling costs of developing a plan, courts will usually request
and receive extensive support from a jurisdiction’s redistricting office. Relying on state
officials can often place them in a delicate position, though, especially if they owe their
jobs to incumbents whom the court’s plan could potentially threaten. Moreover, many of
these officials may have helped craft the plan that the court recently struck down and may
feel some sense of obligation to the bargain that gave birth to that plan. In some cases,
they will be working on plans for their legislative bosses as the court works on its own
plan, so they will be forced into the impossible position of being a partisan tool on one
day and a neutral line-drawer the next.
The delicacy of “seizing” a redistricting office illustrates a fundamental personnel
problem that affects any court developing its plan. Ideally, courts should hire people who
are skilled in the art of redistricting, knowledgeable about the state, and politically
unbiased. It is remarkable how rarely these three qualities exist together in potential
88
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assistants to the court. Redistricting experts that are also knowledgeable about the state
have usually been tapped by one party or another and have an obvious conflict, or their
appointment will lead to apoplectic objections from participants in the litigation. As a
result, courts will often turn to experts from outside the state and try to use hearings or
other means to give the line-drawers the information they need to construct the map. Of
course, outsiders will be accused of a lack of sensitivity to local politics and communities
of interest, which to some extent is what makes them more qualified in the court’s eyes.
D. Gag Orders, Confidentiality and Security
At the risk of beating a dead horse, let me reemphasize the sensitive nature of the
task performed by those who assist the court in constructing a plan. As the court begins
the line-drawing process, everyone is eager to know who is “winning” under the court
plan. Moreover, inside knowledge might lead to a change in the bargaining position of
the parties who may be attempting to iron out a deal before the court releases its plan. As
a result, it is imperative that the computers and rooms are secure and off-limits to any
legislators or interested parties who often just happen to be roaming nearby. Further, it is
often in the interest of those working on the plan, let alone the court, to have a gag order
in effect that prevents them from discussing their work on the plan with any outsiders.
State employees, in particular, who are likely to be pressured by the state legislators with
whom they work on a daily basis, may want to have some document that they can wave
in front of the many people who want to pump them for information.
E. Where to Begin?
1. When, If Ever, Should Hearings Be Held?
Depending on the time constraints placed on a plan and the model the court
chooses to follow, a court or a special master may wish to hold hearings before it begins
the process of drawing its own map. The court could limit participation in the hearing to
the parties to the underlying litigation or it could open it to the public. The substantive
scope of the hearing could run the gamut from proposed principles to guide the court or
Special Master in construction of the plan, to proposals of actual plans, partial plans, or
proposed districts. Such hearings can aid the court in providing building blocks for its
plan as well as justifications for the districts it later draws. Moreover, given the now
widespread availability of computer mapping software, such hearings can constitute
remarkable examples of participatory democracy with all kinds of groups attempting to
identify their community of interest and to have their say over the court plan. Of course,
when time is of the essence such hearings can constitute a major distraction from the
actual work of drawing a plan. One alternative, in order to save time, is to allow written
submissions from all interested parties and to place them on a publicly available website.
Also, in the event the court does not have hearings at the front end, it can always hold
them after it releases its plan.
2. Choosing an Initial Plan as a Template
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One of the more important decisions to be made at the front end of a redistricting
process concerns what plan, if any, the line-drawers should work from in constructing the
court’s plan. This will, of course, depend on the context of court involvement and
whether its role is to make minor modifications to the plan it just struck down or to draw
a more comprehensive plan. Among the possible starting points are: (1) the existing
plan; (2) a preexisting plan from a prior redistricting; (3) plans submitted by the parties or
outsiders; or, (4) working from scratch. To some extent this decision will be driven by an
assessment as to which plan best articulates the state’s redistricting traditions and
principles. Of course, the default option, based on the considerations mentioned in the
discussion of deference above, is to work off the existing plan, but often the
constitutional or other legal infirmities in that plan will disqualify any plan that merely
tinkers at its edges. Additionally, in some cases, doing so is literally impossible, such as
when a state loses or gains a significant number of congressional districts.
Often it makes sense for the court to pick out sections of proposed plans and
merge them together. For example, a court might decide to accept a Republican-authored
plan for Republican areas of a state, a Democratic plan for Democratic areas of the state,
and for the court to draw its own lines for competitive regions. Needless to say, the
decision to work off of only one political party’s plan invites criticism on grounds of bias.
Also, a court should beware of non-partisan explanations offered for plans proposed by
partisan actors. Rarely will a political actor propose a district by saying “this helps out
me and my friends but hurts my opponents, and therefore the court should adopt this
plan.” More likely, partisans will justify their plans by appeals to arguments about the
proposal’s respect for traditional redistricting principles, and in particular, representation
of communities of interest.
3. Which Data to Use?
Any data that can be tied to a geographic point or area can be incorporated into a
redistricting program. That is, any information that can describe a piece of land or its
occupants can be part of the information that line-drawers see and consider as they draw
a redistricting plan. Certain types of data are more difficult to come by (e.g. credit card
data or magazine subscription lists) than others (e.g., publicly available census data), and
states vary significantly in which data they make publicly available. Before beginning
construction on its map, the court should decide what data they would like loaded into the
redistricting program (as well as which redistricting program the mapmaker should
use89). Furthermore, opposing parties to the underlying litigation will often want to
verify the accuracy of the data that the court will be using to construct its plan.
a. Census Data⎯The P.L. 94-171 File
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The data that the Census Bureau makes available in time for decennial
redistricting is presented in the P.L. 94-171 redistricting dataset.90 This dataset is
specifically designed to allow jurisdictions to comply with one-person, one-vote and the
Voting Rights Act. Therefore, it only provides the following data: aggregate population
and voting age population totals broken down by race and Hispanic origin.91 It provides
these data for every level of census geography: census blocks, block groups, tracts, etc. 92
Courts should also make a decision as to the level of geography at which the plan should
be drawn. The smaller the level of geography the more easily one can comply with oneperson, one-vote, as well as other constraints. However, redistricting at the block level
(which is what most line-drawers do) will often increase the odds that districts will be
less compact and that precincts will be split (unless such features are assiduously
respected).
In the event the court redraws lines at some point after the first two years of a
census cycle, other census data might also be available. Those data would come either
from short form data (such as citizenship status) released later, census projections, or data
gathered from the long form of the census or another census survey. The long form of
the 2000 census asked questions of one of six respondents concerning, for instance, the
condition of their dwelling, certain socioeconomic characteristics, and family
information, most of which is irrelevant to the redistricting process.93 Furthermore,
certain projections of census data might also be available, although their reliability will
obviously be shaky as one gets farther down the level of geography and farther away
from the original census, and might not be available at the block level.
Indeed, this raises another issue for a court to consider if it is redistricting in the
middle of the decade, which it often does if it is responding to a lawsuit. Relying on
beginning-of-the-decade census data for a mid-decade redistricting naturally ensures that
the plan will not take into account population changes that have taken place since the last
90
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census. However, relying on census projections⎯even assuming they are available for
the necessary level of geography⎯opens the plan up to the charge that the underlying
data are mere unreliable speculations, as opposed to an actual enumeration of the area’s
population. For the most part, courts drawing congressional plans will play it safe and
use the outdated census numbers, which remain the “best census data available”94 in
order to comply with the strict requirement of population equality. For noncongressional plans, a court could also use the old data while paying attention to the
census projections so as to justify deviations from perfect population equality in faster
growing parts of the state.
b. Political Data
As described in the next Part, the decision whether to pay attention to the
partisan- or incumbency-related effects of a plan may be the most important decision a
court makes. If the court does wish to know the political effects of its plan, many
different types of data might be available.
For the states that collect it, the easiest data to acquire are party registration data,
which indicate how many Democrats, Republicans, Independents, etc., live in a particular
area. Those data provide a rough cut of the political character of an area, but they are not
terribly reliable in predicting the partisan advantage or competitiveness of a district.
Because in some areas, and for some population subsets (e.g., rural Southern whites),
party identification and voter preferences often may not be coterminous, registration
statistics will not give an accurate picture of the likely outcome of an election in that
district. Moreover, in areas with a large number of independents, the registration data
will give no answer as to the likely partisan predisposition of the district.
Therefore, to assess the true political complexion of an area one needs to examine
previous election data. But which elections will be most revealing? The difficulty here is
that most elections are not competitive, so their results will misrepresent the expected
vote a candidate of a given party will achieve in a future election. Using presidential
election returns from Texas in the last election, for example, would not produce reliable
predictions for redistricting of the Texas legislature since the data are warped by the fact
that an incumbent president, who was also a former governor of the state, was the
Republican candidate and his opponent did not waste time competing for votes in that
state. The same can be said for most congressional elections, in which the incumbent
usually trounces a low-quality challenger.
In attempting to construct the “normal vote” for an area, ideally several elections
will need to be aggregated together to get an idea of how the average Democrat or
Republican candidate will perform in the district, holding all other qualities of the
candidate or unique characteristics of the election equal.95 The political parties develop
for themselves (and keep tightly guarded) intricate models of political performance that
they use when drawing their plans. Sometimes time prevents courts from developing
similar statistics, but looking at the last few competitive statewide elections or down
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ballot races96 as proxies for political performance can provide a rough idea of the
advantage, if any, that a party will have in a particular district.
Finally, almost all states provide in their redistricting datasets the location of
incumbents’ residences. In fact, sometimes a redistricting program will designate their
residences by a small elephant if the incumbent is a Republican, or a little donkey where
the Democratic incumbent resides. If the court wishes to pay attention to incumbent
residence⎯in order to avoid incumbent pairings, for example⎯such data can easily be
loaded into the program if they are not there already. Of course, anyone’s address
(including that of potential challengers or other potential candidates) could be loaded into
the program as well, and datasets controlled by parties will include them.
c. Community of Interest and Topographical Data
In addition to the obviously relevant data described to this point, jurisdictions
might also include all kinds of data designating community characteristics. Locations of
schools, universities, prisons, churches, army bases, country clubs, airports, factories,
farms and the like can be called up on the computer screens, as well as socioeconomic,
cultural or other community-describing data that might be incorporated into the program.
The same can be said for data that describe the land, as opposed to the people.
One can identify where forests, wetlands, mountain ranges, bodies of water, islands,
parks, etc., are located, as well as transportation lines, such as roads, railroads, subways,
bridges, and highways. Such topographical and transportation features might be useful
guideposts for drawing district boundaries, as they often form natural (or artificial)
barriers between regions that allow for the creation of “neat” districts with easily
identifiable edges.
d. Political Boundary Data
In addition to census categories of geography, which normally form the building
blocks of districts, a variety of politically significant boundary lines receive great
attention in the process of building a redistricting plan. Indeed, for some states these
boundaries have important legal statuses because the law prohibits unnecessary or
excessive splits of political subdivisions. Political subdivisions come in many forms:
counties, parishes, cities, towns, school districts, judicial districts, water districts, etc. In
general, county lines are relatively fixed, but for some political subdivisions, the lines are
hardly static: city lines will often change frequently due to patterns of annexations and
secessions. This is all the more true for precincts, some of which may change yearly to
accommodate rapid population growth. Ideally, to minimize disruptions to electoral
administration, a court should strive to use precincts as the building blocks of a plan.
However, both time and concerns about compliance with one-person, one-vote and other
legal requirements lead to redistricting at the census block level.
Also, it is often helpful to look at other districting arrangements when
constructing a plan for another representative body. For example, if one is charged with
the responsibility of drawing a plan for a state’s lower house, it may be helpful to look at
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the lines drawn for the state’s senate. Or if one is drawing a congressional map it may be
useful to examine the boundaries of the legislative elections. The state’s redistricting
computer will typically include all kinds of existing and past districting arrangements for
every representative body from town council to school board to Congress.
F. Incorporating Objections to the Plan
Even if the court does not hold a hearing before work on the plan begins, it will
often hold a hearing after releasing the plan, in order to receive objections and comments.
Before entertaining objections, it is important for the court to decide what kind of
objections, if any, it is willing to accommodate. Obviously, the court will consider all
legal arguments and, if valid, accommodate them. But what about objections clothed as
arguments to make the plan “better”? Will arguments as to partisan bias in the plan or
unfair pairing of incumbents be the kind of objections that will lead to changes in the
plan? Will the court accommodate objections as to respecting political subdivision lines
or communities of interest? What about deals that incumbents in adjoining districts have
worked out among themselves? What about arguments as to the difficulties of
administering elections under this new set of lines? With each accommodation of
objections or suggested changes the court will be forced to justify: why this change and
not others? Moreover, with each change will come a new round of objections, because
expectations that were settled before the change become unsettled once a new line is
drawn. Stakeholders who remained silent under the previous plan will now have
objections they consider equally valid to those that the court accommodated and that
placed them in their worsened position. In other words, once the court starts making
changes, it will be difficult to stop. The omnipresent fear of unraveling should provide a
healthy counterbalance to the natural inclination to please as many people as possible.
G. Giving the Legislature a Third Bite at the Apple
Once the court releases and adopts its plan, should it nevertheless still allow the
legislature one last shot to pass its own plan? Obviously, if the state fails to pass a plan
before the court finishes its own, it is unlikely to do so soon afterward. But in some
cases, the political parties may have been holding out for the court’s plan to see how they
might fare.
When the court releases the plan and establishes a new default, however, the
obstacles to compromise may melt away. For example, if both parties see the court’s
plan as threatening their incumbents equally, perhaps they will both now agree to a
statewide incumbent-protecting gerrymander. Compromise prior to the release of the
court’s plan is often difficult if either party believes the court will draw a more favorable
plan than the one its opponent is offering. Once the results of that gamble are known and
the parties bargaining positions change, new possibilities may arise.
The court should decide at the front end of a redistricting process if it plans to
give the legislature a third bite at the apple once the plan is released. The court probably
does not want to inform the parties of its intentions; otherwise they might be even less
likely to iron out a compromise in the intervening period. However, by deciding at the
front end whether the legislature will be given another chance, the court can organize the
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calendar for development of its plan accordingly. For redistricting plans for jurisdictions
covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, a court considering whether to give the
legislature another chance must also acknowledge the possibility that its plan might go
into effect if the legislature’s plan cannot receive preclearance quickly.
The law is far from clear as to whether a court must or should allow a legislative
plan to supplant its own plan, if it can be done in time for upcoming elections. On the
one hand, the principles of legislative deference described above would suggest allowing
this third bite at the apple.97 On the other hand, once the state has abdicated its role as
redistricter, its argument that the court should invest an incredible amount of time, effort
and resources into constructing a plan, but nevertheless allow the state another chance,
rings pretty hollow.
III.

Substance

The applicable law, by itself, is insufficient to direct the production of a
districting plan. The ultimate form of a plan depends on important decisions that the
relevant actors will make concerning nothing less than the undergirding philosophy of the
plan. To be sure, the state’s traditional districting principles will provide additional
guidance, but such principles are open to multiple interpretations, and a mapmaker can
draw a near infinite number of plans that comply with such principles, as well as the
applicable law. In the event that the court is not merely touching up a plan it just struck
down, it will usually ask its experts to draw compact, contiguous districts based on
political subdivision lines. Beyond those principles, courts will vary considerably in the
degree of attention they will pay to maintaining the cores of districts or protecting
incumbents.
A. Traditional Districting Principles
Given the Supreme Court’s fascination with “traditional redistricting principles”
in its racial gerrymandering cases, it is unsurprising that courts charged with drawing
their own maps latch onto those principles for guidance.98 The “big three” on such a list
would include compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivision lines,99
although which principles are “traditional” will always depend on the particular state.
Just behind those three come respecting communities of interest, respecting the cores
and/or configurations of prior districts, and protecting incumbents.100 Of course, many of
these principles might run headstrong into legal requirements such as the Voting Rights
Act or one-person, one-vote, which will often force the creation of non-compact districts
that break up political subdivisions or significantly change previous districts.
It is important to note at the outset that there is no such thing as “neutral”
districting principles, no matter how strong the historical pedigree or embodiment in
tradition some principles can claim. Anyone with sophisticated knowledge of the
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political geography of the state can tell you who wins under the application of one or
another “neutral” districting principle. The effect of ordering the creation of compact
districts that adhere to political subdivision lines, for example, will bias a plan in favor of
the political party that is more evenly and efficiently dispersed throughout the state.101
This is not to say that such principles come anywhere near approaching the bias produced
by a political gerrymander. However, once the court announces the principles that will
guide its plan and prioritizes them, all interested parties will have a good idea as to who
will likely be advantaged.
1. Compactness
The first inclination for almost any person in charge of redrawing a map is to say
“let’s clean it up.” Indeed, non-compact or bizarre-looking districts usually indicate that
“something is up”⎯meaning that some intentional decision has been made to group
people into a strangely shaped district. Aesthetic characteristics by themselves, though,
provide a poor philosophical justification for drawing district lines, except insofar as
certain mathematical measures of compactness can fairly be said to be politically neutral.
Compact districts may have the advantage of providing coherence to a districting
arrangement, and in theory, they give voters and candidates clearer signals as to the
boundaries of the “district community.” However, this is not necessarily so. One could
draw compact districts that group unrelated communities on different sides of a mountain
or river, that cobble together areas unconnected by roads so candidates must travel
outside their district in order to get from one part of it to another, or that stick adjoining
communities together despite the absence of any unifying characteristics. Nevertheless,
the widely perceived neutrality of compactness measures provides a court plan with a
strong claim of credibility and non-partisanship.102
Compactness not only lies in the eye of the beholder, but it can be measured in
several ways such that a district that is very compact according to one measure could be
non-compact as compared to another. One set of measures compares the area of the
district with that of the smallest circumscribing circle, or square or rectangle. Others
measure the ratio of the perimeter of a district to its area. Still others might be more
sensitive to the number of protrusions from a district, as well as the district’s length or
thinness. Several of these measures actually contradict each other, which is to say that as
a district’s score increases according to one measure, it decreases according to another
measure.103 If compactness is a value that the court plan intends to further, settling on
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one or more of the various measures at the outset can guide the line-drawer in
maximizing its value.
2. Contiguity
A district is contiguous if one can walk to each part of the district without having
to go through another district.104 Contiguity is usually not a difficult value to further in a
plan. Courts should be aware of a few pitfalls, such as what to do in cases of point
contiguity (where two parts of a district connect to each other at a single intersection of
two lines) or water contiguity (where one must travel through water in order to go from
one part of the district to another) or functionally noncontiguous districts (where the parts
of a district appear connected on the map, but the absence of certain roads or bridges
means that one cannot travel to all points in the district except by swimming or walking
around the district). For the most part, however, the greatest danger with respect to noncontiguity occurs by accident, when line-drawers overlook an errant census block in the
middle of a district that they have assigned to another district far away.
3. Respect for Political Subdivision Lines
Respecting political subdivision lines, which is sometimes required by the state’s
constitution, usually refers to avoiding “splits” of counties, cities or other municipalities.
Courts should be clear as to the hierarchy of political subdivisions that need to be
protected and how violations of political subdivision boundaries will be measured. If one
must choose between splitting a city between two districts or a county between two
districts, for example, which political subdivision should one subordinate? In general,
courts prefer to avoid splits of the largest subdivisions (usually counties) and tolerate a
greater number of splits of cities and (especially) precincts. Also, should all breaks of
political subdivision lines be treated equally? In other words, should a small intrusion
into a county in order bring a district up to population equality “count” as much as cutting
a county completely in half?
There are many different ways to measure respect for political subdivision lines.
With counties, for example, one can count the number of counties that are kept
whole⎯meaning that no district line intersects with a county line⎯and how many
counties are split between two, three, and four districts. However, one must decide
whether the number of counties that are split or the number of times a county is split is to
be minimized. For example, if one is forced to choose between splitting one county into
five districts or two counties each into two districts, which decision should one make?
One could also articulate this principle from the district’s perspective: in other words,
how many districts straddle two counties, how many straddle three, etc. One must then
decide whether to prefer one district that contains parts of four counties, for example,
over two districts that each straddle two counties.
As with compactness measures, there is no normatively superior method for
assessing compliance with a political subdivision requirement. Indeed, advocates for
political subdivisions sometimes prefer that the city or county be split between two
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districts as opposed to being unified in one, because then they will have influence over a
greater number of representatives. At the same time, when a map splits one county (but
not its neighbors) among several districts, advocates for the cannibalized county will
likely complain that they will now be ignored by each representative that has just a slice
of the county. Similarly, insofar as representatives sometimes wish to have relationships
and frequent contact with the local political bodies of the counties they represent, a
greater number of partial counties per district might hinder the forming of such
relationships.
Finally and perhaps needless to say, protection of political subdivision boundaries
often conflicts with the applicable legal constraints and other traditional districting
principles. Because some political subdivisions are themselves quite strangely shaped,
drawing districts around them might lead to a lower compactness score according to
certain measures. As with compactness, however, fidelity to this principle might lead one
to draw districts that split communities that happen to straddle a political subdivision
boundary. Indeed, in order to prevent vote dilution and a violation of the Voting Rights
Act one might need to cross a boundary to unify two minority communities that happen
to be divided by a city or county line. Moreover, the greater attention one pays to precise
mathematical equality between districts, the greater the number of political subdivisions
that will be split.
4. Communities of Interest
Respecting communities defined by common interests, while a value central to
any theory of representation, is the most slippery of traditional districting principles. As
mentioned above, claims of protection of communities of interest often serve as pretexts
for the advancement of partisan goals in the redistricting process. Drawing a district
around a heavily pro-Union town is tantamount to creating a Democratic district, for
example, just as drawing a district around a Christian Evangelical community would lead
to the creation of a Republican district. A court should treat all advocates’ claims of
communities of interest with skepticism, or at the very least, opponents should be given
the chance to enlighten the court as to the partisan interests underlying such seemingly
neutral declarations.
With that said, many possible plans for a given jurisdiction could comply with the
allegedly neutral requirements of compactness, contiguity, respect for political
subdivision lines, and the applicable law. Therefore, information as to the defining
features of a community can often give some direction for particular decisions as to
whether a line should go this way or that, when the other principles provide no guidance.
When a court searches for justifications for its districts, arguments based on communities
of interest can often supplement other traditional districting principles in order to bring a
sense of coherence to the plan. When one must decide between drawing a line in a
random direction or in a way that captures an identifiable community, one might as well
draw a line that keeps in tact the community of interest.
One of the most persistent criticisms of court-drawn plans is that, in their haste
and based on their lack of knowledge, courts tend to overlook communities of interest. If
true, this would be a serious criticism, but when compared to partisan or incumbent-
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protecting gerrymanders, court-drawn plans, even unwittingly, tend to do as well, if not
better, in the protection of such communities.
5. Preserving Cores or Configurations of Prior Districts
Court plans, especially “least-change” plans, will often try to maintain the cores
and configurations of existing districts to the extent possible. By respecting the current
district cores or configurations a court plan maintains the identity of the district and
usually preserves continuity of representation for voters and their representatives. Of
course, the court’s ability to preserve the current district shapes will depend on the extent
of the legal violations in those districts and the degree of deference owed to the existing
plan. Moreover, some truly serpentine districts do not have a core to respect, so any
change might seem like a drastic alteration to the district.
The decision to preserve existing districts has obvious political consequences. By
adopting this principle in its plan, the court reinforces the partisan bargain (or lack
thereof) underlying the plan it has invalidated. It gives its imprimatur to the current
district arrangements regardless of their political bias and regardless of the additional
protection such a strategy gives to incumbents. More than anything⎯perhaps even more
than avoiding a pairing with another incumbent⎯incumbents wants to keep the districts
that elected them intact. Thus, the decision to follow a principle of preserving district
cores or configurations inadvertently is often a decision in favor of preserving safe seats
for incumbents.
B. Incumbent Protection
Should court-drawn plans go out of their way to protect incumbents? On the one
hand, such a principle, if followed by a court, is fraught with danger. Once it starts
paying attention to the effect of its map on certain incumbents, the court may be forced to
explain why it protected some incumbents, but not others. Further, many find it wholly
inappropriate for a court to heap onto incumbents advantages additional to the many they
already enjoy. It might be all well and good for a legislature to protect its own, but why
should a court be in the business of placing a thumb on the scale in favor of incumbent
reelection?105
On the other hand, insofar as continuity of representation, let alone seniority and
experience, are values of good governance that courts should hope to further, ignoring the
effect of a plan on incumbents could lead to one that radically reshapes a jurisdiction’s
government.106 Elsewhere I have discussed in greater depth the arguments in favor of
incumbent protection.107 The arguments are most powerful for courts considering
congressional redistricting plans, because a court’s decision to disadvantage incumbents
could actually lead to less political power for the state vis-a-vis other states. Since
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seniority translates into power in the House of Representatives⎯e.g., leadership or
committee positions⎯a court plan that culls the number of returning incumbents could
have a noticeable effect on the relative power of the state in Congress. Also, the
argument in favor of incumbent protection of state legislators has greater force in states
with term limits: if incumbents have a short life span to begin with, courts might be less
eager to interrupt the constituent-representative relationship than they would under
conditions where incumbents can entrench themselves.
If a court decides to protect incumbents, how should it go about it? The first task
for a court to perform is to identify who the actual incumbents are. This sounds easier
than it actually is, because the court must learn which incumbents are planning to run for
reelection. It makes little sense to draw a district for a particular incumbent if that
incumbent is not running for office again. Moreover, if the court is releasing drafts of its
plan incumbents may change their campaign plans as their district becomes more or less
likely to reelect them.
Having identified the incumbents and where they reside, most courts that go down
this path will endeavor to reduce the number of incumbent pairings⎯that is, reduce the
number of districts that contain the residences of two or more incumbents. However,
pairings too can be deceptive, especially when (as in races for the U.S. House of
Representatives) a congressman can run from a district in which he or she does not
reside.108
In order to truly protect an incumbent, a court should pay attention to the
character of the district into which the incumbent was placed, rather than merely whether
another incumbent will be joining him or her. Indeed, the best way to protect incumbents
is to ask them to propose their own districts or to keep them in their current district with
minimal changes. A somewhat less gross way to protect them is to return them to a
district with a partisan distribution of voters similar to their former district⎯in other
words, keep a Republican incumbent’s district Republican, and a Democrat’s
Democratic. Simply removing incumbent pairings, while placing incumbents in radically
redrawn and sometimes politically hostile districts, may do very little to serve the alleged
values of protecting incumbents.
One final note on this topic: there is an intermediate way to incorporate
incumbent protection without turning the court into the handmaiden of politicians who
already have tremendous advantages over their opponents in elections. One could draw a
plan without paying attention to incumbency and then, as an after-the-fact “quality
check,” could make minimal adjustments to the nonpartisan plan in order to reduce
incumbent pairings or to return incumbents to their prior districts. By placing incumbent
protection last in the queue of principles to apply, the court avoids anchoring each district
around an incumbent from the beginning, while at the same time accommodating a
limited number of objections or adjustments that could control the potential havoc that
the plan might wreak on the state’s legislative delegations.
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C. Promotion of Competitive Districts
At the opposite end of the good government spectrum from incumbent protection
comes the principle that the court should promote competition. Not only should it avoid
giving incumbents a leg up, the argument goes, the court should actively try to promote a
robust competitive democracy.
Even if a court is hell-bent on promoting competition, though, how should it do
109
so?
Practically-speaking, it is often very difficult to create genuinely competitive
districts, while at the same time respecting the kinds of traditional districting principles
described above. Residential self-segregation of Democrats and Republicans, as well as
the strictures of the Voting Rights Act described above, make the construction of
politically competitive districts quite difficult. Often, the only way to turn an urban
democratic district into a competitive district, for example, is to turn the city into a pizza,
with slices radiating out from the inner city and extending to the suburbs and rural areas.
In doing so, a court might also run the risk of diluting the minority vote by grouping it
with a largely white, suburban, and rural vote.
Furthermore, in order to get a handle on the potential for a hypothetical district to
be competitive over the long term, one needs to know whether an incumbent will be
running for reelection or whether the district will be an open seat. A court seeking to
maximize competition might thus create a district around a Republican incumbent that is
more heavily skewed Democrat than it would be if that incumbent chose not to run for
reelection. (And of course, the court gets into real difficulties if, after it announces its
plan, the incumbent, seeing his new, unfavorable district, decides not to run.)
As mentioned in Part II, the key to producing competitive districts, as with
gerrymandered districts, is to employ accurate data that can do a good job of predicting
electoral outcomes. Courts, like anyone who must make these approximations on the fly,
are not very good at this. The most courts can hope for, I think, is that their plans do not
go out of their way to stifle competition.
D. Partisan or Political “Fairness”
Quite obviously the one thing a court cannot do is attempt to use its redistricting
power intentionally to further the interests of his or her favored party. But what if, at the
other extreme, the judge wants to assiduously avoid appearing biased or unintentionally
producing a plan that is? To further that goal a court must remove the veil of political
ignorance from its eyes and pay attention to the likely partisan victors under its plan.110
In particular, the court would look at the relative effects of its plan on each party’s
incumbents and the expected share of seats each party will win. In the abstract, this task
appears fraught with the dangers captured by the political thicket metaphor, and if the
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court seems like it is in the business of picking winners and losers, the court’s plan will
lose all credibility. However, at the margins, the court can check to make sure its plan
has not had the effect of producing a wildly unrepresentative legislature, or punishing one
party’s incumbents disproportionately. For example, should the court sit idly by if, when
it releases its plan, it sees that it has only paired Republican incumbents against each
other, chopped up Republican districts but left the Democratic ones in tact, or
overrepresented Democrats by creating a heavily disproportionate number of districts in
which their supporters constitute a majority?
The same could be said for the racial fairness of a plan. Even apart from bald
violations of the Voting Rights Act, a court may want to avoid opening itself up to the
accusation that it paired minority incumbents but not white incumbents, or that it paired
women incumbents but not male incumbents. Although the urge to ignore incumbency
data looms large, the danger of what might happen as a result often forces courts to peek
at the effects of its plan before releasing it. Rarely will everyone involved in redistricting
litigation agree that a court-drawn plan is “fair.” By looking at the partisan data while
constructing its plan, however, a court might be better able to avoid the accusation that its
plan is severely biased (in its effects, if not its intent) against one of the parties.
IV.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to lay the groundwork for a more systematic
investigation into the patterns of behavior when judges become mapmakers. The law
places a number of constraints on judges as they take on the “unwelcome obligation” of
venturing deep into the political thicket to draw district lines. Despite these constraints,
courts have experimented with a variety of approaches to court-drawn plans. They differ
greatly in the procedures they follow and the substantive guidelines that produce the plan.
We have come a long way since Colegrove,111 when the idea of judges drawing maps
seemed unthinkable. We still have a way to go, however, to develop “best practices” to
guide judges when they are carving democracies.
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